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THE SCIENCE OF DIGITAL FORENSICS:
RECOVERY OF DATA FROM OVERWRITTEN
AREAS OF MAGNETIC MEDIA
Fred Cohen
Seeking to understand the state of scientific consensus surrounding an area of
forensics is often problematic. You cannot prove a claim about an unlimited set
in the sense of testing every possibility. And yet there is a level of consensus
surrounding the science of the day.
This is a slightly altered portion of an expert report I wrote recently, released
with permission, that I thought might serve as an example of how to go about
seeking the truth and presenting the state of the science when truly definitive
statements based on first principles are not available. Of course, I look forward
to the readership proving me wrong with real-world examples, but somehow, I
doubt if I will find any.
INTRODUCTION
The first time I encountered data loss and recovery effects of magnetic memory
was as a night and weekend computer operator for the computer science
department of Carnegie-Mellon University in the 1973-1974 time frame. Part of
my job involved dealing directly with outages and failures associated with
magnetic memory components used in what, at the time, were large computer
systems. On occasions, portions of magnetic core memory or disk drives would
encounter various failure modes and the systems using these devices would have
to be reconfigured to operate without the failed components until repair
personnel could come in to repair them, typically during normal business hours
on weekdays. In the early hours of one Sunday morning, I was having such
problems with a magnetic core memory module (a cabinet about 6 ft. high and 3
ft. across), and after awakening the manager in charge was instructed to restart
the memory and continue the operation of the computer, setting a particular
value into a particular memory location to cause the system to continue
operation. After several such incidents within a period of less than an hour, a
more definitive outage was produced after a mechanical impulse was applied to
the cabinet, the memory was reconfigured out of the system, the system operated
at reduced memory until the next weekday, and no further outages were
experienced.
The next time I encountered a similar incident involving magnetic memory loss
and recovery was as a systems administrator in the early 1980s while I was a
graduate student at the University of Southern California. A VAX computer I
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was tasked with maintaining encountered a problem associated with an inability
to restore from and access backup tapes after regular maintenance on the tape
drives was completed. While newly written tapes were readable, tapes written
from before the maintenance were not readable. I determined that the tape head
alignment was different after the maintenance than before the maintenance, and
set about to realign the tape head by mechanically adjusting a set screw while
continuously reading from the tape and displaying the output to a screen until
the output reflected output reasonably expected from the tape being tested. I then
restored and rewrote the tapes as appropriate to reflect the proper alignment and,
in doing so, recovered lost data associated with the difference in head alignment.
I continued to track progress in this area over the years by helping to create
standardized approaches to dealing with the life cycle of data, including
identifying and summarizing existing standards1 like DoD 5200.282, 5200.28M3, and so forth.
In the late 1990s, I increasingly worked on issues related to digital forensics,
security, and countering security measures. Included in these issues was work in
recovery of data involved in forensic investigations, including recovery from
data and media disposed of according to different practices. This included
writing software to recover data, identifying issues related to the destruction of
data to various levels of surety, and recovery of data from such destruction
processes. Experiments involving various media were undertaken as part of my
research at Sandia National Laboratories, including rapid destruction techniques,
and recovery from data destroyed with such techniques. I was also involved in
various efforts to recover data in investigations for private concerns, in systems
used for national security, in matters involving law enforcement, for private
individuals, and in other similar situations. As part of that work, I identified the
available methods for data destruction and recovery, life cycle issues associated
with systems and data, and related issues involving media of various sorts. I have
also studied, written a peer reviewed research paper, and given scientific
presentations on methods of recovery of data from disk drives for forensic
applications, including recoveries used in legal matters.

1 See: http://all.net/books/standards/remnants/standards.html
2 See: http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SMA/fasp/documents/c&a/DLABSP/d520028p.pdf
3 See: http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/blaw/dodd/corres/pdf2/p520028m.pdf p520028m.pdf
(1973)
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HISTORICAL METHODS
According to information from 19964, as of that time:
“In the 1980's some work was done on the recovery of erased data from magnetic
media, but to date the main source of information is government standards
covering the destruction of data. There are two main problems with these official
guidelines for sanitizing media. The first is that they are often somewhat old and
may predate newer techniques for both recording data on the media and for
recovering the recorded data. For example most of the current guidelines on
sanitizing magnetic media predate the early-90's jump in recording densities, the
adoption of sophisticated channel coding techniques such as PRML, the use of
magnetic force microscopy for the analysis of magnetic media, and recent
studies of certain properties of magnetic media recording such as the behavior
of erase bands. The second problem with official data destruction standards is
that the information in them may be partially inaccurate in an attempt to fool
opposing intelligence agencies (which is probably why a great many guidelines
on sanitizing media are classified). By deliberately under-stating the
requirements for media sanitization in publicly-available guides, intelligence
agencies can preserve their information-gathering capabilities while at the same
time protecting their own data using classified techniques.” [P4]
This paper described coding issues with overwriting of disk media and the
notional methods of reading from areas imprecisely “seek”ed on disk and
through magnetic force microscopy (MFM) and magnetic force Scanning
Tunneling Microscopy (STM). The conclusion at that time was that multiple
overwrites with different patterns were required to eliminate actual residual data
physically present in the form of flux density variances detectable with analogue
methods, and that because of variances, even this would be inadequate with
MFM or STM.
In the same time frame, DoD practices5 indicated:
“Overwriting is a process whereby unclassified data are written to storage
locations that previously held sensitive data. To satisfy the DoD clearing
requirement, it is sufficient to write any character to all data locations in
question. To purge the AIS storage media, the DoD requires overwriting with a
pattern, then its complement, and finally with another pattern; e.g., overwrite
first with 0011 0101, followed by 11001010, then 1001 0111. The number of
4 Peter Gutmann, “Secure Deletion of Data from Magnetic and Solid-State Memory”,
Sixth USENIX Security Symposium Proceedings, San Jose, California, July 22-25,
1996
5 “A Guide to Understanding Data Remanence in Automated Information Systems”,
NCSC-TG-025 - Library No. 5-236,082 – Version-2, Section 5: “Standards”.
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times an overwrite must be accomplished depends on the storage media,
sometimes on its sensitivity, and sometimes on differing DoD component
requirements. In any case, a purge is not complete until a final overwrite is made
using unclassified data.”
And below that:
“5.2.2 MAGNETIC HARD DISKS
The DoD has approved both overwriting and degaussing as methods to clear or
purge this media. See Section 4, "Risk Considerations," and DoD 5200.28-M for
additional information.”6[P17]
Section 4 indicates, in pertinent parts:
“4.4 STORAGE DEVICE SEGMENTS NOT RECEPTIVE TO OVERWRITE
A compromise of sensitive data may occur if media is released when an
addressable segment of a storage device (such as unusable or "bad" tracks in a
disk drive or inter-record gaps in tapes) is not receptive to an overwrite. As an
example, a disk platter may develop unusable tracks or sectors; however,
sensitive data may have been previously recorded in these areas. It may be
difficult to overwrite these unusable tracks. Before sensitive information is
written to a disk, all unusable tracks, sectors, or blocks should be identified
(mapped). During the life cycle of a disk, additional unusable areas may be
identified. If this occurs and these tracks cannot be overwritten, then sensitive
information may remain on these tracks. In this case, overwriting is not an
acceptable purging method and the media should be degaussed or destroyed.
4.5 OVERWRITE SOFTWARE AND CLEARING
Overwriting is an effective method of clearing data. In an operational system, an
overwrite of unassigned system storage space can usually accomplish this,
provided the system can be trusted to provide separation of system resources and
unauthorized users. For example, a single overwrite of a file (or all system
storage, if the circumstance warrants such an action) is adequate to ensure that
previous information cannot be reconstructed through a keyboard attack. Note:
Simply removing pointers to the file will not generally render the previous
information unrecoverable. Software used for clearing should be under strict
configuration controls. …
4.6 OVERWRITE SOFTWARE AND PURGING
The DoD has approved overwriting and degaussing for purging data, although
the effectiveness of overwriting cannot be guaranteed without examining each
application. If overwriting is to be used in a specific application, software
6 “A Guide to Understanding Data Remanence in Automated Information Systems”,
NCSC-TG-025 - Library No. 5-236,082 – Version-2, Section 5: “Standards”.
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developers must design the software such that the software continues to write to
all addressable locations on the media, in spite of intermediate errors. All such
errors in usable sectors should be reported with a listing of current content. In
addition, unusable sectors must be completely overwritten, because the unusable
sector list will not show whether the sector ever contained any sensitive data. If
any errors occur while overwriting or if any unusable sector could not be
overwritten, then degaussing is required.” [P14]

METHODS FOR RECOVERY OF OVERWRITTEN HARD DRIVE
DATA AFTER 2001
Between the late 1990s and the middle 2000s, I was unaware of any changes in
the status of up-to-date hard drives with regard to data recovery. However, I also
participated in many forums related to data recovery in forensics cases, and was
aware of many of the methods in use. During the time starting from about 2000,
I don't recall any instance of hearing or reading about recovery of data from
overwritten areas of hard drives. While many technology changes were
underway and methods for recovery were in use, none of these recovery methods
involved recovering data from areas of a disk that had been previously
overwritten.
In 2006, the National Institute of Standards and Technology stated the following
in this regard in its guidelines for media sanitation (Page 6):7
“Advancing Technology has created a situation that has altered previously held
best practices regarding magnetic disk type storage media. Basically the change
in track density and the related changes in the storage medium have created a
situation where the acts of clearing and purging the media have converged. That
is, for ATA disk drives manufactured after 2001 (over 15GB) clearing by
overwriting the media once is adequate to protect the media from both keyboard
and laboratory attack.”
In other words, in 2006, the National Institute of Standards and Technology
asserted that overwriting a disk drive of this sort once is adequate to make the
overwritten data unrecoverable by any known methods. Keyboard attack in this
context means any command issued from a computer, including those that
actuate specific hardware mechanisms of specific disk drives. Laboratory attack
ranges to the use of analog hardware, electron microscopy, special processing of
7 Richard Kissel Matthew Scholl Steven Skolochenko Xing, NIST Special
Publication 800-88 ”Guidelines for Media Sanitization: Recommendations of the
National Institute of Standards and Technology”, Computer Security Division
Information Technology Laboratory National Institute of Standards and
Technology Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8930, included by reference herein as
iNISTSP800-88_rev1.pdf [Exhibit 13]
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materials, and other similar techniques.
The best available technique I am aware of published since 1996 indicates only a
1 in 10,000 chance of being correct when trying to determine a previous value for
any given overwritten bit (1 or 0 value) of data based on looking at residual
content after only a single overwrite of the corresponding disk area.8 Quoting:
The basis of this belief is a presupposition is that when a one (1) is written to
disk the actual effect is closer to obtaining a 0.95 when a zero (0) is overwritten
with one (1), and a 1.05 when one (1) is overwritten with one (1). This we can
show is false and that in fact, there is a distribution based on the density plots
that supports the contention that the differential in write patterns is too great to
allow for the recovery of overwritten data. …
Consequently, we can categorically state that there is a minimal (less than a
0.01% chance) of recovering any data on a NEW and unused drive that has a
single raw wipe pass (not even a low-level format). In the cases where a drive
has been used (even being formatted for use) it is not possible to recover the
information – there is a small chance of bit recovery, but the odds of obtaining a
whole word are small.
To put this in context, in trying to extract a single byte of data (8 bits often
associated with a single ASCII character in a document) using the identified
techniques, the chances of being correct in such an extraction is 1 in 10 32 better
with this technique than with random guessing. In practice, no meaningful data
recovery is feasible.
In order to seek additional information, I made requests for such information on
a variety of online forums where members of various digital forensics
communities communicate. I asked for any example refuting the results of the
Wright et. al. Paper. To date, I have found no example of any instance in which
digital data recorded on a hard-disk drive and subsequently overwritten was
recovered from such a drive.
It is my opinion based on the information I have been able to discern, that any
distinctions in terms of the ability to recover overwritten data between
overwriting modern hard-disk drives one time, several times, while skipping
tracks back and forth, and/or by other similar methods, are distinctions without
any practical difference.
In 2007, as a result of work in a legal matter, and based on prior work including
8 Wright, Craig; Kleiman, Dave; Sundhar R.S., Shyaam, “Overwriting Hard Drive
Data: The Great Wiping Controversy”, in “Information Systems Security: 4th
International Conference, ICISS 2008”. Lecture Notes in Computer Science
(Springer-Verlag New York, LLC) , 2008 December; 5352: 243-257.
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prior work in recovery of data from a floppy disk with analog methods,9 I ended
up trying to recover data from an old floppy disk through purely electronic
means, not involving an electron microscope or similar special purpose
equipment. In this case, I ended up co-authoring a paper about data recovery in
such situations where the data was no longer available because of the loss of
magnetic flux density over time and through various wear and degradation
mechanisms.10
My approach involved a combination of adjusting the seek location of read heads
through the use of set point screws on multiple floppy drives and multiple reread
attempts until a read succeeded. The rereading approach essentially generates
multiple values for data that is degraded to the point where it probabilistically
yields a 1 or 0 after processing, and uses the cyclic redundancy (CRC) codes of
the disk drive to ignore result until one comes out with content matching the
CRC code read. This works for weak bits (cases where the residual data is very
nearly adequate to trigger a proper read), but is of no use in cases of overwrite,
where the data last written is essentially always a stronger signal than the
previous data it overwrote. Analysis was then performed to determine the
likelihood of a wrong read coming up as valid and identifying what, if any,
changes could occur to produce a valid read based on loss of signal strength
rather than overwrite.
Then, on or about 2008-12-05, I was contacted by a researcher I had known via
communications in forensics-related Internet forums since at least 2005. He sent
me a copy of a draft of an about to be published paper titled “Overwriting Hard
Drive Data: The Great Wiping Controversy”11 in a message indicating “I am
presenting the attached paper in a couple weeks. I still find it difficult to believe
that nobody decided to test Dr. Gutmann's supposition that you could recover
data using an electron microscope.”12
After review, I asked several questions and got replies that satisfied me with
regard to the issues in the present discussion. He replied to a request of mine

9 Hans-Joachim Leimkueller, “Computer Evidence Analysis and Recovery of
Magnetic Storage Medlia Data”, 1995. Proceedings. Institute of Electrical and
Electronics Engineers 29th Annual 1995 International Carnahan Conference on
Security Technology, 18-20 Oct 1995IEEE, 1995.
10 F. Cohen, and Charles M. Preston , “A Method for Recovering Data From Failing
Floppy Disks with a Practical Example”, IFIP TC11 presented Jan 2008, Published
in “Advances in Digital Forensics IV”, Springer, ISBN 978-0-387-84926-3, pp2942, 2008.
11 See Wright above for the final version.
12 Personal email not included in this editorial paper.
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asking for a formal citation indicating that it would appear soon.13
“The publication is ICISS 2008, LNCS 5352 (Pp 243-257)
http://www.springerlink.com/content/408263ql11460147/?p=650ee5e3e45d4e
1e845e
2bfe8a959f1a&pi=20
Information Systems Security
4th International Conference, ICISS 2008, Hyderabad, India, December 16-20,
2008, Proceedings
Series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Subseries: Security and Cryptology , Vol. 5352
Sekar, R.; Pujari, Arun K. (Eds.)
2008, XIII, 307 p., Softcover
ISBN: 978-3-540-89861-0
I am presenting the paper in about 10 days. The conference paper is:
http://www.seclab.cs.sunysb.edu/iciss08/”
A copy of that publication is included herewith, and it is consistent with the
previous copies sent to me and subsequent disclosures made to me and included
herein as described below.14 Our subsequent correspondence later yielded
additional data including:
“Hi
I have the data for the same regions already. In this case it is just the issue of
processing this into the images. At present I have produced distribution plots
when writing 1s then 1s, 0s then 0s, 0s then 1s, and 1s then 0s produce 0's and
1s...

13 Personal email not included in this editorial paper.
14 R. Sekar and A.K. Pujari (Eds.): ICISS 2008, LNCS 5352, pp. 243–257, 2008.
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As for "depth", this comes more to the intensity of the media. When you look at
figure 2 (above) the best you get is the intensity of each grain in the bit cell. This
is as much as you can read.
Each grain varies within the bit cell. If you look at the image above, though the
intensity varies, there is no information that tells you anything of value in data
recovery. For instance, the 4th bit cell across from the left (a “0”) has a
comparatively high intensity region on both junctions of the cell (the left and
right walls).
What you get is that the depth idea is magic rather than science. You can see the
cumulative charge, not the underlying grains. In the next generation of drives
this all becomes moot. As the write goes to a single particle domain, there is no
off track data in existence, but for the time being, we still have issues coming
from the nature of the bit cell composition and the grain structure that forms it.
...”
He included two other files15 with this email16 and those files supported the
specific contentions made.
Among the results was an attempt to recover data using the best available
methods, both from a disk which was overwritten 3 times with 0 byte values and
from a disk that was written once with 0 values before writing only the desired
data, and for which the location of the data on the disk was known in advance.
The following extract from that paper shows the extent to which the best
available methods in 1995 we were able to recover data from areas of a hard disk
drive overwritten once.
The “Correct display” section represents the known good data originally placed
15 Personal correspondence not included in this editorial paper
16 Personal correspondence not included in this editorial paper
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on the disk drive. The “Display from recovery (optimal)” section shows the best
that could be achieved from the best case scenario in which multiple prior
overwrites with 0-valued bytes are undertaken prior to placing the data on a
known location on the disk. The “Display from recovery (expected)” section
shows what can be realistically achieved in recovery of data overwritten with 0valued bytes once after normal use.
To gain clarity around the issue, a better result would be attained by simply
guessing that every byte represents a space (“ ”) character. Don't be fooled by
imagining that the occurrence of similar characters in sequences of a few bytes
represents recovery. Random generation of symbol pairs is subject to the
birthday paradox and has a higher probability than you might think of appearing
in two texts of this size. In order to claim any notion of recovery, it would first
be necessary to identify that the same bits were in the same locations within the
stream, and because of coding issues, even long sequences that appear identical
to other text may be a residual of the coding scheme starting in the wrong place
and producing higher probability sequences that happen to be present in both.
From that time until this, I have heard of no studies or experiments that indicate
to me that any refutation of these results has been demonstrated or claimed. I

regularly read relevant scholarly publications and participate in various forums
in this arena, and have not heard of any example from that time to this of any
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use of forensic evidence associated with reading overwritten areas of hard disk
drives. As disk drives have continued to become higher density, newer methods
used to write with more efficient low-level coding, and areas where bits are
stored in physical form have become increasingly modularized on the media,
such recovery has become infeasible by any known method.
In or about 2011, Peter Gutmann updated his paper from July 22-25, 1996 to
reflect the changes in technology leading to the infeasibility of recovering data
from modern disk drives once overwritten. In pertinent parts, it indicates:
“Looking at this from the other point of view, with the ever-increasing data
density on disk platters and a corresponding reduction in feature size and use of
exotic techniques to record data on the medium, it's unlikely that anything can
be recovered from any recent drive except perhaps a single level via basic errorcancelling techniques. In particular the drives in use at the time that this paper
was originally written are long since extinct, so the methods that applied
specifically to the older, lower-density technology don't apply any more.
Conversely, with modern high-density drives, even if you've got 10KB of
sensitive data on a drive and can't erase it with 100% certainty, the chances of
an adversary being able to find the erased traces of that 10KB in 200GB of other
erased traces are close to zero.
Any modern drive will most likely be a hopeless task, what with ultra-high
densities and use of perpendicular recording I don't see how MFM would even
get a usable image, and then the use of EPRML will mean that even if you could
magically transfer some sort of image into a file, the ability to decode that to
recover the original data would be quite challenging.”17
Furthermore, other methods of recovery, such as reading with analogue devices
or varying the alignment of disk heads all depend on the presence of the same
underlying mechanisms as are identified by the aforementioned methods, and
thus the methods identified here are the more definitive in terms of determining
feasibility of recovery of overwritten data.
It is my view at this time that the open scientific community dealing with digital
forensics now accepts these results in practical terms, that erasure of modern
hard disk drives with a single overwrite is adequate to render the overwritten
data unrecoverable by any known methods. This is also reflected in subsequent
queries of members of the global digital forensics community.

QUERIES FOR INSTANCES REFUTING THE WRIGHT ET. AL.
17 Peter Gutmann, “Secure Deletion of Data from Magnetic and Solid-State Memory”
retrieved from http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/pubs/secure_del.html on
2012-05-27
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RESULTS
In order to seek out refutations of these results from the historical record and
personal knowledge of others, I sent the following message:
“I am looking for any actual cases where an overwritten portion of a hard disk
drive was recovered using any method. Does anyone know of any such case? Email me directly and I will summarize... FC
To be clear, I know of a case where data loss over time was recovered using
analogue or reread techniques, and have heard of (but not seen cited) cases where
this was done for floppy disks, and cases where non-overwritten portions of hard
drives were recovered, but as far as I can tell, there have never been any cases
where areas of hard drives actually overwritten were subsequently recovered.
If anyone knows of such a case, I would appreciate being contacted with details.
Please email directly to fc@all.net - and I will summarize for the group.”
To the following online groups:
Computer Security and Forensics (5,130 members),
Current Topics in Digital Investigation Techniques (293 members),
Digital Forensic Certification Board (283 members), Digital Forensics
Association (DFA) (4,423 members),
Digital Forensics Research Conference (DFRWS) (499 members),
International Information Systems Forensics Association (1535 members),
Techno Security & Digital Investigations Conference (1215 members), and
Digital Forensics in the Classroom (2450 members).
While there is substantial overlap between these groups, they represent a broad
spectrum of individuals with expertise ranging from certified digital forensic
practitioners with testifying experience over periods of years to educators who
teach these issues in undergraduate and graduate classes, to investigators for law
enforcement and private concerns who regularly do digital investigations, to
speakers at international conferences from all manner of organizations.
To date I have found no example of any instance in which digital data recorded
on a hard disk drive and subsequently overwritten was recovered from such a
drive since 1985, when about 15% of the overwritten data was claimed to have
been recovered from an modified frequency modulation (MFM) disk drive.
Several people have had discussions in order to more clearly understand exactly
what the question was, and of course there are data recovery methods that may
work when the areas being examined have not been overwritten by other data,
such as those used on floppies in the previously cited example, but none of the
respondents had any relevant examples.
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Based on these results and interactions, I believe that there is a consensus
surrounding the irretrievability of overwritten data on modern hard disk drives
in the identified communities. Indeed, there appears to be nobody in the
identified community that disputes this result with any actual basis and no
example of recovery of data from overwritten areas of modern disk drives. The
only claims that there might be such a capability are based on notions
surrounding possible capabilities in classified environments to which the
individuals asserting such claims do not assert they have actual access and about
which they claim no actual knowledge.
It is my opinion based on the information I have been able to discern, that any
distinctions in terms of the ability to recover overwritten data between
overwriting modern disk drives one time, several times, while skipping tracks
back and forth, and/or by other similar methods, are distinctions without any
practical difference. All of these overwriting methods render data on a modern
disk drive unrecoverable by any known methods.

EDITORIAL SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
It is not my intent to offer this as a peer reviewed paper, or I would have done
so. It is not my claim that this represents a model of how to write an expert report
either. My point is to seed the clouds of discussion about how to seek the truth
from a scientific standpoint.
I recognize that the technology and surrounding science change over time. As a
result, the time may come – perhaps very soon – when some new approach yields
results allowing such recovery. Perhaps it will be nano-devices that slowly eat
away the magnetic surface taking measurements of flux density as they go, and
perhaps this will yield amazing results. Perhaps not. That's one of the interesting
things about science. But I still have to report on what I can best determine from
available data.
The consensus approach is hardly definitive scientific work – but it is a way to
check my work against others in the field, and it did yield some clarity about the
state of the art in recovery, even if that was not relevant to the specific question
at hand.
I look forward to the opinions of others – sent to the editor, to me, or as part of
published work. And I hope this will stimulate some discussion around what is
“good enough” and what is not.
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